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The failure of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) 1999 ministerial
conference in Seattle was a shock to the traditional trade-policy commu-
nity. Most member governments and outside observers believed that trade
ministers would be able to hammer out an agenda for a new round of multi-
lateral trade negotiation, diﬃcult though this would be and vague or am-
biguous the language might be on some points. Instead, not only did min-
isters fail to establish an agenda or set a date for a new round of trade
negotiations, but the meeting revealed deep divisions among governments
and private-sector groups concerning the nature of the globalization pro-
cess as it was being shaped by such public international organizations as
the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank,
as well as by multinational private corporations.
Fortunately, as a consequence of much hard work by the WTO director
general Mike Moore and the country representatives stationed in Geneva,
plus several key compromises by ministers, the ministerial meeting on
trade held in Qatar in November 2001 was successful in launching a new
round—the Doha Development Agenda—in January 2002. However, one
agenda item important for some industrial countries, namely core labor
standards, was rejected outright, and negotiations on a number of other
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only if there is “explicit consensus” among members to proceed.
Observers of trade negotiations have long been accustomed to bitter dis-
putes among members on such issues as agricultural liberalization, the ap-
propriate tariﬀ-cutting rule to adopt, and the extent and timing of liberal-
ization obligations on the part of the developing countries. But the run-up
to Seattle and the meeting itself highlighted two sets of deeply held beliefs
about the WTO and the trading system that industrial-country govern-
ments had largely been able to ignore until that time.
First, and most important, most developing countries felt that the ben-
eﬁts they received from the Uruguay Round negotiations fell far short of
what they had expected in return for signing the agreements promoted by
the developed countries during this round. They concluded, for example,
that the adjustment burdens placed on them under the agreements on
trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and trade-related invest-
ment measures (TRIMs) were much greater than those imposed on the de-
veloped countries in areas such as agriculture and textiles/clothing. The de-
veloping countries also felt that the time schedules established for them to
implement the obligations assumed in previous agreements were too short
and inﬂexible and that the developed countries were not fulﬁlling their
parts of the bargains struck on such issues as agriculture and textiles/ap-
parel. Furthermore, they were frustrated by what they perceived to be the
misuse by developed countries of certain WTO rules for protectionist pur-
poses, especially those related to antidumping. All these views made de-
veloping-country governments reluctant to agree to developed countries’
proposals to establish new WTO rules in trade-related areas such as com-
petition policy, environmental standards, labor rights, government pro-
curement policies, and foreign direct investment. Moreover, developing
countries felt isolated and marginalized in the WTO’s internal processes,
especially as they worked at Seattle itself. As a consequence of these views,
the developing countries were quite prepared to see the Seattle ministerial
meeting (as well as the later Doha ministerial conference) fail, unless the
agenda included action items that would seriously address their concerns.
Second, as became evident in Seattle from the street demonstrations
and the harassment of delegates, many nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) were deeply dissatisﬁed with certain consequences of the global-
ization process resulting from the international liberalization of trade, in-
vestment, and ﬁnance. These groups tended to be mainly concerned about
three issues: the environment, human and worker rights, and inequality
and poverty, particularly in developing countries (see chapter 1 in this vol-
ume by Elliott, Kar, and Richardson). Environmentalists are concerned
with such matters as the maintenance of biodiversity and pollution in crit-
ical ecosystems. They fear that trade liberalization and the resulting com-
petition for international markets may lead directly to unsustainable con-
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reduction in existing environmental standards. Similarly, according to
many worker-rights and human-rights advocates, trade liberalization and
unrestrained foreign direct investment in developing countries lead to
lower wages; to unhealthy, unsafe working conditions; and, in some in-
stances, to the loss of basic human rights in these countries. The NGOs in-
terested in promoting greater income equality and reducing poverty are
also skeptical about the merits of freer ﬂows of goods, technology, and cap-
ital in furthering their goals.
As with the views of developing countries, trade oﬃcials and interested
parties in the private sector had been aware for several years that a growing
number of NGOs opposed the international liberalization of trade, invest-
ment, and ﬁnance. Yet these NGOs did not receive much attention from the
governments and international economic institutions that were promoting
this liberalization until the late 1990s, when they began to organize large
street protests at the meetings of such key trade and ﬁnancial institutions
as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank and at the meetings of inter-
governmental organizations such as the Group of Eight (G8) and private
groups like the World Economic Forum.1 Even then, the protesters were
initially largely dismissed as being anarchists and economically irrational.
However, as those who seem bent on violence have been relegated to a less-
prominent role and as more and more formal and informal contacts have
been established between proponents and opponents of further liberaliza-
tion of trade, ﬁnance, and foreign investment, the anti-globalization move-
ment has become an important force to be reckoned with in public and
private decision making in these areas. Nevertheless, the divergence of pol-
icy positions between the groups is still very wide.
Given the new willingness of the developing countries to assert their
power over the form of international liberalization eﬀorts and the growing
inﬂuence of NGOs highly critical of previous eﬀorts to increase the world-
wide ﬂows of goods, technology, and investment funds, the nature of future
globalization is very much in question. An important reason for the con-
tinuing disagreement and misunderstanding is both a lack of careful case
studies and statistical analyses (in contrast to anecdotal evidence) con-
cerning the eﬀects of various aspects of this process, and a lack of infor-
mation among many aﬀected by globalization of the knowledge we already
have on the subject.
This conference volume aims both at informing those concerned with
globalization issues about the knowledge that economists have already
gained in studying various aspects of the topic and at providing new
knowledge based on the research of the authors. We focus largely on the
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1. One exception was the World Bank’s attempt to create a dialogue with the NGOs from
1995 onward.economic eﬀects of globalization over which there is disagreement between
pro-globalists and anti-globalists, and then we focus on only a small num-
ber of the many points in dispute. We believe, however, that the papers in-
cluded here cover the issues of greatest interest to policymakers and the
general public. Globalization is a large, complex, and relatively new sub-
ject, so the papers of the volume do not adopt a standard approach or
methodology. Rather, each is tailored to the subject it treats, aiming eﬃ-
ciently to communicate to the reader what is known and not known in the
various areas. In some cases we deal with precisely deﬁned research issues
whereas in others the need is for a broad account of a topic. The papers are
grouped under ﬁve headings.
The Critics
The ﬁrst group of papers deals directly with the critics of globalization,
describing them, characterizing their objectives and discussing their views
in economic terms.
In chapter 1, Kimberly Elliott, Debayani Kar, and J. David Richardson
contrast the “talkers” about globalization—the critics—with the “doers.”
They describe who the critics are, where they came from, and what they
want, and then they ask how economists and others might understand
them better and what their views imply for globalization. They note that
many critics are themselves strongly internationalist and want to see glob-
alization proceed, but under diﬀerent rules. Some, particularly the pro-
testers in the streets, focus mainly on what is wrong with the world. But
some of them put forward broad alternative visions, while others oﬀer de-
tailed recommendations for alleviating the problems they perceive in the
current style of globalization. Most of the critics have their roots in long-
standing transnational advocacy eﬀorts to protect human rights and the
environment and reduce poverty around the world. What brings them to-
gether today is a concern that the processby which globalization’s rules are
being written and implemented is undermining democracy and preventing
the beneﬁts from being shared broadly.
Elliot, Kar, and Richardson translate the issues and concerns that moti-
vate the critics of globalization into the terms, concepts, and analytical ap-
proach of mainstream economics. They attempt to capture the concerns of
Southern as well as Northern critics and to analyze the issues that divide
them as well as those that bring them together. The authors ﬁnd more reso-
nance for the critics’ agenda in existing economic analysis than is commonly
recognized by either the critics or the “doers” of globalization. Finally, chap-
ter 1 evaluates those issues and alternative proposals on which even glob-
alization enthusiasts and the critics might come together cooperatively.
In chapter 2, Carl B. Hamilton considers directly the charge that glob-
alization undermines democracy. He ﬁnds a superﬁcial plausibility to the
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ular, he reports survey results suggesting considerable support for global-
ization among the peoples of the world, although certain countries (e.g.,
France, Australia, Turkey, and Argentina) buck the trend, which is pos-
sibly, in the latter pair, a reﬂection of their recent ﬁnancial crises. There is,
however, a fairly widespread suspicion that globalization is bad for jobs.
Hamilton argues from these results that the NGOs’ hostility to globaliza-
tion is not well grounded in popular support. But even if it were, he argues,
the NGOs display a marked democratic deﬁcit themselves: They are re-
sponsible to no one and are heavily biased toward the rich industrial coun-
tries rather than being representative of the South.
In the second part of chapter 2 Hamilton argues that democracy has
both an intrinsic and an instrumental value, and that the World Bank,
which is now heavily focused on issues of governance, should be less coy
about promoting it directly. (He would not make democracy a condition
for receiving World Bank loans, however.) He also argues that openness
and globalization are positively associated with democracy—either pro-
moting it or resulting from it—and from this he concludes that concerns
about the democratic consequences of globalization are exaggerated.
Trade Flows and Their Consequences
Part II of the book considers the extent to which diﬀerent countries can
take advantage of globalization to expand their trade and two sets of con-
sequences for any such expansion—the decline in prices facing primary
product producers and the relocation of production to “pollution havens”
that permit dirty technologies.
Chapter 3 by Stephen Redding and Anthony J. Venables investigates the
determinants of countries’ export performance, looking in particular at
the role of international product-market linkages. It begins with a novel
decomposition of the growth in countries’ exports into the contributions
from increases in external demand and from improved internal supply. For
any exporter, the former is derived from aggregate expenditure in each
market deﬂated by its local prices and its internal trade costs and aggre-
gated over markets using a function of distance between the exporter and
the market as weights. The latter (supply) component of export growth re-
ﬂects the exporter’s size (the number of varieties it produces) and its own
internal trade costs. Among the notable results of this decomposition is the
dominance of supply capacity growth in Southeast Asian exports over
1970–1985, but the importance of market access growth during the subse-
quent period 1985–1997, with the majority of that access growth coming
from within the region. For sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, mar-
ket access growth was below average over the entire 1970–1997 period and
supply capacity growth was actually negative.
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move on to an econometric analysis of the determinants of export perfor-
mance. Their results include the ﬁnding that poor market access, poor in-
ternal geography, and poor institutional quality contribute in approxi-
mately equal measure to explaining sub-Saharan Africa’s poor export
performance.
In chapter 4, Christopher L. Gilbert and Panos Varangis consider the
eﬀects of the trade and marketing liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s on
the West African cocoa producers. They pay particular attention to the
“adding up” problem: Although each cocoa producer is small enough to
have virtually no eﬀect on world prices individually, if all liberalize simul-
taneously their aggregate eﬀect is to drive world prices down. Since
African exporters account for 60 percent of world production, such global
eﬀects are likely to be larger in cocoa than in any other commodity market.
Gilbert and Varangis’ results show that a 3 percent reduction in taxes
and intermediation costs (internal marketing) results in a 1 percent fall in
the world cocoa price. Farmers in the liberalizing countries remain better
oﬀ (by 2 percent), but developed country consumers also beneﬁt (by 1 per-
cent). Approximately one-third of the cost reduction in the African cocoa-
producing countries arises out of eﬃciency gains and two-thirds from tax
reductions. Thus the farmers’ beneﬁt is approximately equal to the gov-
ernments’ (and taxpayers’) loss, while the beneﬁts of the eﬃciency gains
accrue more or less to developed-country consumers.
None of this implies that liberalization is undesirable, but it does suggest
that the calculus of costs and beneﬁts from liberalization is more complex
than the proponents of liberalization programs have sometimes suggested.
In particular, advocates of liberalization may have insuﬃciently distin-
guished the beneﬁts of increased competition in commodity marketing
from those of reduced taxation.
Jamie De Melo and Jean-Marie Grether join the debate on globalization
and the environment in chapter 5. They ask whether trade and investment
liberalization have allowed ﬁrms to relocate activity toward countries with
low pollution controls, or “pollution havens.” If so, there will be more pol-
lution per unit of output and more output since lower abatement costs will
induce greater demand. They work with a sample of ﬁfty-two countries
over the period 1980–1998, analyzing shifts in production, consumption,
and trade in the ﬁve most polluting industries.
Globally, de Melo and Grether ﬁnd that revealed comparative advan-
tage in polluting products fell for developing countries for the ﬁve pol-
luting products as a group, as one would expect if the environment is a
normal good in consumption. However, this overall result was due to the
inﬂuence of one important product, namely, nonferrous metals, for which
the revealed comparative advantage ratio in developing countries fell sig-
niﬁcantly.
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data for dirty industries and show that, compared with nonpolluting in-
dustries, dirty industries have higher barriers to trade in the form of larger
elasticities of bilateral trade with respect to transport costs. These results
conﬁrm the intuition that most heavy polluters are both weight-reducing
industries and producers of intermediate goods. For these sectors, proxim-
ity to users will enter location decisions more heavily than for consumer
goods, which are typically high-value products. Thus, they identify natural
barriers to trade in the typical heavy-polluting industries as one of the fac-
tors accounting for less-than-expected relocation of such industries to the
developing countries. Utilizing the diﬀerence in per capita income as a
proxy for the regulatory gap between countries (the greater the per capita
income diﬀerence, the wider the regulatory gap) and controlling for several
factors that inﬂuence the volume of bilateral trade, the authors ﬁnd little
evidence in their statistical analysis that bilateral trade is inﬂuenced by reg-
ulatory gaps.
Overall, de Melo and Grether conclude that there is only limited support
for the pollution-havens hypothesis. They do note, however, that they have
examined only manufacturing and hence cannot take into account the
resource-extracting industries that may have sought pollution havens.
Factor Markets: Labor
Part III contains three chapters on the labor market, covering the inﬂu-
ence of globalization on relative skilled versus unskilled wages, the brain
drain, and the economics of sweatshop labor in the developing world.
Increased trade (or potential trade) with developing countries is fre-
quently blamed for the depression of unskilled wages and employment in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries. Many economists have argued, however, that trade ﬂows are not
large enough to have had such eﬀects or that commodity prices have not
evolved in the way that such a hypothesis requires. Recently, however, re-
search has revealed that vertical specialization—slicing up the value chain
to take less-skilled operations abroad—could aﬀect unskilled wages with-
out ﬁnal commodity price changes or large actual trade ﬂows. Vanessa
Strauss-Kahn explores this possibility in France over the period 1977–1993
in chapter 6. She shows that a decrease in trade costs (globalization) mod-
iﬁes the international structure of production toward vertical specializa-
tion, and that shifting relative labor demand across countries increases
skilled and unskilled wage inequality in a way that is observationally equiv-
alent to skilled-biased technological progress. She evaluates the contribu-
tion of vertical specialization in explaining the observed within-industry
shift away from unskilled workers in France, using detailed input-output
tables and labor data. She ﬁnds that vertical specialization, deﬁned as the
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percent in 1996. Then, regressing industry employment against a scale
variable, capital intensity, and the extent of vertical specialization, she
ﬁnds that the last contributed 11 to 15 percent of the decline in the share of
unskilled workers in French manufacturing employment over 1977–1985
and around 25 percent of the decline experienced over 1985–1993.
Chapter 7, by Simon Commander, Mari Kangesniemi, and L. Alan Win-
ters, surveys current thinking on the brain drain, speciﬁcally from the
point of view of developing countries. Estimates of the relative migration
rates of educated individuals show that developing countries (especially
small ones) can lose large proportions of their skilled workforces. Large
countries, on the other hand, such as China and India, which supply a high
proportion of the developed countries’ skilled immigrants, lose only small
proportions of their overall stock of skills. However, in recent years, mi-
gration has been particularly strong among information-technology work-
ers, and the migration of health workers has long given rise to concern, and
in these sectors outﬂows are proportionately signiﬁcant, even for India.
Early theoretical models of the brain drain hinge around labor market
distortions, such as wage rigidity and subsidies to education. They typi-
cally suggest negative implications from outﬂows, and, although these
models were rarely tested empirically, their authors frequently advocated
strong policy interventions, like taxes, to combat the brain drain. This con-
clusion ignored the role of remittances in sharing the beneﬁts of emigration
as well as the possibility that the improved skills of returning migrants and
the business networks created by expatriates could also add to the local
beneﬁts of brain drain.
The most telling recent attempts to model the implications of the brain
drain stress the formation of human capital and the positive impact that it
can have on economic growth. If the chance of working abroad at high
wages is related to levels of education, opening up the possibility of emi-
gration raises the expected returns to education, which, in turn, increases
the incentives to obtain human capital. Provided that not all the additional
human capital so created actually emigrates, there is a possibility that the
supply of human capital at home increases, thus leading to higher eco-
nomic growth. General empirical evidence suggests that there may be a
grain of truth in these models: private education has expanded consider-
ably in developing countries. There is a caveat, however. Immigrants to the
main receiving countries are carefully screened; if only the best are se-
lected, the increased incentives due to emigration will be relevant only for
the individuals with highest ability who would have chosen education any-
way. The less able may never qualify for emigration, and so will not have
any incentive to undertake additional education. Under this scenario the
developing country would lose its best workers but create no additional
skilled workers; it would unambiguously lose. Commander, Kangasniemi,
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ing about the “beneﬁcial brain drain.”
A frequently heard charge against globalization is that multinational
ﬁrms in developing countries are exploiting their workers by paying them
low wages and subjecting them to sweatshop working conditions. In chap-
ter 8, Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorﬀ, and Robert M. Stern examine
the empirical evidence on this issue as well as what economic theory has to
say about the eﬀects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational
ﬁrms on wages and investment. They begin by reviewing the campaign by
American students against sweatshop conditions in poor-country ﬁrms
producing apparel with logos of their universities and colleges and the con-
troversies arising from the eﬀorts to establish codes of conduct and moni-
toring systems for these ﬁrms. This is followed by a brief survey of what
economic theory has to say about the eﬀects of FDI and multinational
ﬁrms on wages and working conditions in host countries. The chapter con-
cludes with an examination of the empirical evidence on wages and work-
ing conditions associated with multinationals.
The authors are critical both of the lack of broad consultation in the pro-
cesses by which many university and college administrators agreed to es-
tablish codes of conduct and monitoring systems, and of the practicality of
the codes and monitoring systems themselves. They also conclude that
whether transfers of capital, technology, or parts of the production pro-
cesses to developing countries by multinational ﬁrms raise or lower wage
levels in these countries is basically an empirical question. A theoretical
overview of this issue yields ambiguous conclusions. Their review of the
empirical studies of the issue ﬁnds virtually no solid and systematic evi-
dence that multinational ﬁrms adversely aﬀect their workers by paying
lower wages than in alternative employment or worsen their working con-
ditions. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case.
Factor Markets: Capital
Part IV of the book turns more directly to the activities of ﬁrms. Two
chapters consider the behavior of multinational ﬁrms and foreign direct in-
vestments, and the third considers the implications of the recent wave of
mergers and acquisitions.
In chapter 9, Robert Lipsey presents a detailed analysis and appraisal
of the empirical ﬁndings concerning the home- and host-country eﬀects of
FDI. He ﬁrst summarizes the empirical evidence concerning the eﬀects of
FDI on home-country exports and on home-country factor demand and
then discusses wages, productivity, exports, and the introduction of new in-
dustries on the host-country side.
Debate over the possible substitution of U.S. ﬁrms’ foreign production
for U.S. exports began with worries about the U.S. balance of payments in
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cludes that concerns over this possibility have mostly dissipated. His sug-
gested interpretation of these studies is that foreign production by a ﬁrm
or industry has very little inﬂuence on exports from the parent ﬁrm or its
home country since trade is determined by other factors, such as countries’
changing comparative advantages in production. Direct investment, he
states, is mainly about the ownership of production, not its location. There
is some evidence, however, that multilateral operations have inﬂuenced the
demand for home-country factors of production. Speciﬁcally, they have
led to a shift in the United States toward more capital-intensive and skill-
intensive production, while unskilled labor–intensive production has been
allocated to aﬃliates in developing countries.
Consistent with the conclusions reached by authors of other chapters in
the volume, Lipsey ﬁnds abundant evidence that foreign-owned ﬁrms pay
higher wages than domestically owned ﬁrms. In part this is because for-
eign-owned ﬁrms tend to be in high-wage sectors of the economy, to hire
more educated and better qualiﬁed workers than locally owned ﬁrms, and
to be larger and more capital intensive. There is also some evidence that
foreign-owned ﬁrms pay a higher price for labor of a given quality, but
there are not many studies that include data on worker characteristics.
Comparisons of total factor productivity in foreign-owned versus domes-
tically owned ﬁrms almost always ﬁnd productivity levels to be higher in
the foreign-owned ﬁrms. But evidence of spillovers of the higher foreign
productivity to domestically owned ﬁrms is mixed. There is general agree-
ment, however, that FDI leads to the introduction of new industries and
products in the host-country economy and to an increase in knowledge
about demand and world markets and how the host country can ﬁnd a
place in the worldwide allocation of intermediate steps in global produc-
tion. Finally, inward direct investment is associated with faster economic
growth, both through productivity eﬀects and through the introduction of
new products. Lipsey points out, however, that faster growth also involves
disruptions and the destruction of old skills and production techniques,
and some may not ﬁnd foreign involvement to be beneﬁcial, on balance.
In chapter 10 David Carr, James Markusen, and Keith Maskus examine
whether multinational ﬁrms transfer production to developing countries
largely to take advantage of the low wages of unskilled labor in these coun-
tries. They ﬁrst point out that summary statistics comparing average per
capita income in developing countries to average FDI per capita in these
countries show FDI per capita to be the lowest in the poorest countries.
For a given level of per capita income, they also ﬁnd that FDI per capita is
higher the larger a host country’s gross national product. The authors con-
clude from these relationships that FDI is not aimed solely at exploiting
cheap labor for export production and, moreover, that a signiﬁcant pro-
10 Robert E. Baldwin and L. Alan Wintersportion of the existing foreign production in developing countries is in-
tended for local sale.
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus next brieﬂy review recent FDI theory, espe-
cially the knowledge-capital model developed by Markusen that allows for
motives for both horizontal and vertical FDI. They then utilize data on out-
ward investment from the United States for a large number of developed and
developing countries (but, due to lack of data, excluding the least developed
countries) over the period 1986–1997 to test hypotheses from this model
about the patterns and determinants of FDI ﬂows to developing countries.
A feature that diﬀers from their earlier empirical work is the addition to their
econometric estimation of a measure of infrastructure quality to accompany
such host-country characteristics as size (in terms of gross national product),
labor force composition, investment barriers, and trade costs.
Their main conclusion is that U.S. outward investment generally seeks
large, skill-abundant countries. However, outward investment in small
host countries (both developed and developing) seems to be unskilled la-
bor seeking. As far as production for local sales versus exports is con-
cerned, aﬃliates in developing countries are not more export oriented than
aﬃliates in developed countries. Inward investment from the United States
is also encouraged by high-quality infrastructure and low barriers to in-
vesting and discouraged by a country’s distance from the United States.
As the authors point out, these ﬁndings run completely counter to the
contention of some anti-globalists that multinational ﬁrms are primarily
attracted to countries with low-wage labor. They explain that very low-
wage countries receive almost no FDI because branch-plant production
(particularly setting up the branch plant) requires a certain minimum level
of labor skills that are lacking in the very poorest countries. In addition, the
absence of reliable legal institutions and infrastructures in these countries
make them unproﬁtable locations for production.
In chapter 11, Simon Evenett explores the boom in cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions in the late 1990s. To establish a benchmark, he com-
pares it with its predecessor in the late 1980s. The recent one is found to be
at least ﬁve times larger (in real terms), to involve ﬁrms from more OECD
nations, and to include many more service-sector transactions than the
earlier one. Even so, in comparison to the size of national stock market
capitalizations, foreign acquisitions of domestic ﬁrms during this latest
wave  were  small, especially in the Group of Seven leading industrial
economies. Thus, concerns that large shares of economic activity in OECD
countries are falling into foreign hands are greatly exaggerated.
In the second part of chapter 11, Evenett examines the eﬀect of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions on performance in one important service
sector, banking. Speciﬁcally, he estimates the relative importance of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, domestic mergers and acquisitions, do-
Challenges to Globalization: An Overview 11mestic entry and exit, and strategic alliances and joint ventures in explain-
ing changes in interest-rate spreads in thirteen OECD nations. The princi-
pal ﬁndings suggest that the eﬀects of these ﬁrm-driven changes in bank-
ing market structure diﬀer markedly between European Union (EU)
economies and non-EU industrialized economies. In the EU, cross-border
strategic alliances appear strongly to increase spreads—that is, to be anti-
competitive—whereas full cross-border mergers appear to reduce them,
presumably via eﬃciency gains. Domestic changes in industry structure
seem to have little net eﬀect. Outside the EU, on the other hand, domestic
changes have tended to increase spreads while cross-border alliances and
mergers have reduced them in almost equal measure. These results high-
light the importance of diﬀerentiating between types of cross-border inter-
ﬁrm agreements and the pitfalls of generalizing about the eﬀects of the lat-
est wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
Macroeconomics
Finally, part V of this book considers the eﬀects of globalization in the
large—ﬁrst on ﬁnancial stability and second on economic growth.
In chapter 12, Joshua Aizenman evaluates the empirical evidence on
whether opening up developing countries to short-term capital ﬂows in-
creases the chance of ﬁnancial crises and then appraises various recent
proposals for reducing this possibility.
On the basis of his survey of recent research into ﬁnancial crises across
countries, Aizenman argues that there is solid evidence that ﬁnancial open-
ing increases the chances of such crises in developing countries. This re-
search also ﬁnds tenuous evidence that ﬁnancial liberalization increases
growth over time. Thus, there may be a complex trade-oﬀ between the ad-
verse intermediate-run and beneﬁcial long-run eﬀects of ﬁnancial opening.
The core of the problem, he argues, is that we deal with incomplete ﬁnan-
cial markets, exposing creditors to sovereign risk and moral hazard. But,
since greater trade integration erodes the eﬀectiveness of restrictions on
capital mobility, ﬁnancial opening for successful emerging markets that
engage in trade integration is not a question of if, but of when and how.
Aizenman maintains there is no quick ﬁx to the exposure to ﬁnancial crises
induced by ﬁnancial opening and, instead, that we should focus on reduc-
ing the depth and frequency of such crises.
Aizenman is rather skeptical about the eﬀectiveness of many of the new
proposals aimed at reducing the costs of ﬁnancial crises on the general
grounds that any signiﬁcant reform will change agents’ behavior in ways
that are hard to predict without a better understanding of the fundamen-
tal forces explaining sovereign borrowing and default. For example, he
doubts the degree to which such ideas as insurance, which is based only on
meeting ex ante conditionality, will survive the time-inconsistency and
12 Robert E. Baldwin and L. Alan Winterstransparency challenges. Similarly, in view of the greater weight of non-
bank lending and the great increase in the number of institutional in-
vestors, he expects recent reform proposals dealing with better coordina-
tion among creditors and with formation of international bankruptcy
procedures to be vigorously tested by coming crises.
In the ﬁnal chapter, Robert Baldwin reviews and appraises empirical re-
search since the 1950s concerning the manner in which the international
economic policies of governments aﬀect the rates of growth of their
economies. The ﬁrst set of detailed empirical studies of the impact of in-
ternational economic policies on economic growth were undertaken in the
early 1970s in response to the growth diﬃculties faced by a number of de-
veloping countries that had seemed to successfully pursue import-
substitution policies after World War II. The early widespread support by
economists for these policies was based on an extension of the infant-
industry argument to the manufacturing sector as a whole and on earlier
experiences with protecting home markets in various developed countries.
However, case studies of most of the developing countries showed that
their levels of import protection measured on a value-added basis were not
only extremely high and variable across industries, but also penalized ex-
port activities. Later case studies that broadened the policy framework to
include monetary, ﬁscal, and exchange-rate policies further strengthened
the argument that import-substitution policies were holding back growth
rates and helped to convince many developing-country governments to
shift to an export-oriented approach to development.
Stimulated by new theories of endogenous growth and improved econo-
metric techniques in the early 1990s, a succession of large cross-country
statistical studies have found a strong positive relationship between out-
ward-looking policies and growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP)
or total factor productivity. These studies have recently come under criti-
cism, however, especially by Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik, on the
grounds that the tariﬀ and nontariﬀ components in the authors’ broad
measures of openness do not by themselves support this conclusion or that
they fail to do so in a robust manner under reasonable respeciﬁcations of
their econometric models.
Baldwin’s evaluation of this controversy is that, while we should be grate-
ful to Rodriguez and Rodrik for pointing out that a liberal trade policy
alone is not always associated with faster growth rates, these authors adopt
an overly narrow policy viewpoint when they contend that the main impli-
cation of the studies is that countries should dismantle their barriers to
trade. Authors of both the case studies and cross-country statistical anal-
yses almost uniformly argue that a whole set of policies—ranging from
sound monetary, ﬁscal, and exchange-rate policies to responsible govern-
ment behavior and a transparent legal system—is necessary for raising
developing-country growth rates in addition to trade liberalization.
Challenges to Globalization: An Overview 13Some Conclusions
The chapters of this book do not examine every criticism that has been
made of globalization, but especially on the real (as opposed to the ﬁnan-
cial) side of the economy they deal with the main ones. The book demon-
strates that most of the current complaints have already been addressed by
economists in their serious academic research. While most criticisms are
valid in theory under some sets of circumstances, and while many of them
can be identiﬁed to have occurred in speciﬁc cases, most turn out not to be
major systemic problems. Thus, for example, openness to trade (accompa-
nied by appropriate policies elsewhere) generally assists growth, multina-
tionals do not generally drive down wages or labor standards, and trade
does not generally lead to a race to the bottom in environmental standards.
On the other hand, the chapters have conﬁrmed that globalization can
cause problems for some people under some circumstances—for example,
in reducing the prices of primary exports, reducing competition in sectors
subject to mergers and interﬁrm agreements, and via the emigration of tal-
ented workers. In these cases, however, appropriate policy responses can
often serve to alleviate or bypass the problems.
The fact that globalization can cause problems for some people, or in
some circumstances, sometimes appears to be enough for critics to reject
it out of hand. We—and most economists, we believe—would reject that
response. Virtually every issue of public policy involves trade-oﬀs of some
sort. If a society gains on average from a reform, there is a strong case for
making the reform and compensating the losers.
Considering compensation brings us face to face with the issue of the
distribution of welfare—not only of income but also of things like human
rights and social inclusion. These are important issues on which opinions
diﬀer, and it is legitimate for diﬀerent groups to debate their views and to
reach diﬀerent conclusions about economic policies on the basis of them.
Economists as a group have no particular position in these debates, nor ex-
pertise in ruling one view better than another. They do, however, seek to be
explicit about the value judgments entailed in their models and to distin-
guish between judgments on issues such as these and positive economic
analysis (the way in which the economy operates). It is frequently the case
that, once value judgments and analysis are separated, it becomes evident
that objectives can be met more eﬀectively by policies that maximize eco-
nomic welfare than by any others. This is precisely the case for globaliza-
tion: by maximizing economic activity and organizing it eﬃciently it be-
comes easier to achieve the goals to which society aspires.
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